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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) have been a 
source of controversy since their implementation in 1987.1 One 
problem with the Guidelines is that they are not subject to rigorous 
judicial scrutiny.2 A sentence can be overturned on appeal if the 
sentencing judge erred procedurally or if the sentence was clearly 
erroneous.3 But what happens if the Guideline itself is clearly er-
roneous or arbitrary? Courts evaluate claims that the Guidelines 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
under the rational basis standard, a standard which yields mini-
mal scrutiny of the United States Sentencing Commission’s (“Com-
mission”) decision to create the challenged Guideline.4 The Com-
mission, like other administrative agencies, does not create perfect 
Guidelines all of the time. When the Commission promulgates a 
Guideline that is arbitrary and capricious, an aggrieved criminal 
defendant should have judicial recourse to challenge the validity of 
the Guideline and, if she prevails, to have the opportunity to be 
resentenced. 
                                                          
 1. See generally Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-
makes-the-case-for-judgment/463380/. 
 2. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490 (2011). 
 3. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
 4. Andrew N. Sacher, Inequities of the Drug War: Legislative Discrimination on the 
Cocaine Battlefield, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1159 (1997). 




The Commission was established “as an independent commis-
sion in the judicial branch of the United States” by the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”).5 Although the Commission looks like 
an administrative agency, courts have found that the Guidelines 
promulgated by the Commission are not subject to judicial review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).6 
Congress should amend the SRA to subject the Guidelines to 
the more rigorous arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial re-
view.7 This would ensure that the Commission engages in reasoned 
decision-making when promulgating the Guidelines and would 
provide a mechanism for challenging Guidelines for which the 
Commission inadequately considered the purposes of the SRA or 
failed to consider such purposes altogether. Part II provides a brief 
history of sentencing in the U.S. and background on the formation 
of the Commission. Part III shows that, although the Guidelines 
have been legally “advisory” since United States v. Booker,8 they 
carry enormous weight in judges’ sentencing determinations. The 
current sentencing scheme is inherently a ratchet-up system, and 
the presumption of reasonableness of in-Guidelines sentences from 
Rita9 has strengthened the influence of the Guidelines. Part IV ex-
plains the traditional route of appellate review of a sentence for 
reasonableness and rational basis review when a sentence is chal-
lenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause. Part V explains 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and why it should 
be applied to the Commission. Finally, Part VI shows how imple-
menting arbitrary and capricious review of the Guidelines would 
operate, and it calls for Congress to amend the SRA to allow such 
review. 
 
                                                          
 5. Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1984). 
 6. See United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 7. Some critics of the U.S. Sentencing Commission have called for a new sentencing 
commission that would be subject to a higher standard of judicial review. See, e.g., Kate Stith 
& Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in 
the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 231 (2005). 
 8. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 9. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 
1984 AND THE SENTENCING COMMISSION 
Although the Constitution does not dictate which branch of 
government shall have control over the sentencing of convicted 
criminals, it is well-established that Congress has the ability to set 
sentencing ranges and to set limits on the scope of judicial discre-
tion.10 The first two hundred years of the United States were char-
acterized by judges having broad discretion in the sentence im-
posed and in the information that they could consider in making 
the sentencing determination.11 Furthermore, prior to the SRA, 
federal sentencing orders were practically unappealable if they 
were within the prescribed sentencing range.12 The then-manda-
tory Guidelines imposed by the SRA of 1984 brought about a mon-
umental retraction of judicial discretion in sentencing. 
The Commission is an independent agency in the judicial 
branch.13 The Commission “unquestionably is a peculiar institu-
tion within the framework of our Government. Although placed by 
the Act in the Judicial Branch, it is not a court and does not exer-
cise judicial power.”14 Rather, it is an independent agency that 
promulgates Guidelines for the federal courts.15 Congress created 
the SRA to cure two main problems in federal sentencing: first, 
“the great variation among sentences imposed by different judges 
upon similarly situated offenders,” and second, “the uncertainty as 
to the time the offender would spend in prison.”16 The Commis-
sion’s principal purposes are: 
                                                          
 10. William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to 
§ 3553 After Booker and its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 635 (2008). 
 11. Id. citing inter alia 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (“No limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an 
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing 
an appropriate sentence.”). 
 12. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440–41 (1974). 
 13. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989). 
 14. Id. at 384–85. 
 15. Id. at 385. 
 16. Id. at 366. 




(1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for the fed-
eral courts, including guidelines to be consulted regarding 
the appropriate form and severity of punishment for offend-
ers convicted of federal crimes; 
(2) to advise and assist Congress and the executive branch 
in the development of effective and efficient crime policy; 
and 
(3) to collect, analyze, research and distribute a broad array 
of information on federal crime and sentencing issues, serv-
ing as an information resource for Congress, the executive 
branch, the courts, criminal justice practitioners, the aca-
demic community, and the public.17 
The Guidelines were intended to promote uniformity in federal 
sentencing and the Commission was to act as the leading force in 
efficiently reaching this objective. 
In 1989, the Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutional-
ity of the Commission and the Guidelines and granted approval of 
both.18 In Mistretta v. United States, John Mistretta was indicted 
for three counts stemming from a cocaine sale in the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri.19 Mistretta moved to have the Guidelines de-
clared unconstitutional as violating the separation of powers doc-
trine, and because “Congress delegated excessive authority to the 
Commission to structure the Guidelines.”20 The district court, and 
later the Supreme Court, rejected these claims.21 The Mistretta 
                                                          
 17. An Overview of the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/over-
view/USSC_Overview.pdf. 
 18. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374. 
 19. Id. at 370. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 374 (“[W]e harbor no doubt that Congress’ delegation of authority to the 
Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional require-
ments.”). 
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Court acknowledged that the Commission is tasked with exercis-
ing judgments on matters of policy.22 In so doing, Congress “sets 
forth more than merely an ‘intelligible principle.’”23 
The Court further held that the Commission “is not a court 
and does not exercise judicial power.”24 Rather, it is an independent 
agency under the Judicial Branch.25 In justifying the Commission’s 
power to promulgate the Guidelines, the Court pointed to the Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934 where Congress conferred power to the fed-
eral courts to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.26 
One critique of this comparison is that it compares procedural rules 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with substantive rules un-
der the Guidelines.27 The Supreme Court rejected the importance 
of the substantive nature of the Guidelines vis-à-vis the procedural 
nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.28 The Court held 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not entirely proce-
dural because they have important effects on the substantive 
rights of litigants.29 Furthermore, the Mistretta Court held that 
granting the authority to promulgate Guidelines to the Commis-
sion “pose[s] no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial 
Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond the con-
stitutional bounds by uniting . . . the political or quasi-legislative 
power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts.”30 
Thus, Congress appropriately delegated the authority to the Com-
mission to determine sentencing ranges for all federal crimes.31 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Scalia stated he was “at a loss to 
understand why the Commission is ‘within the Judicial Branch’ in 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 378. 
 23. Id. at 379. 
 24. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384–85. 
 25. Id. at 385. 
 26. Id. at 387 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2016)). 
 27. Id. at 391–92. 
 28. Id. at 391. 
 29. Id. at 392 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)). 
 30. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393.  
 31. Id. 




any sense that has relevance to today’s discussion.”32 Justice Scalia 
argues that the Commission is not under the judicial branch be-
cause it is not controlled by the judiciary.33 Nonetheless, the Com-
mission’s status as a lawfully-created judicial branch agency has 
remained unchanged.  
III. THE GUIDELINES ARE FUNCTIONALLY MORE THAN 
MERELY ADVISORY. 
Before United States v. Booker, federal judges were required 
to follow the Sentencing Guidelines; in other words, the Guidelines 
were mandatory.34 The Court’s decision in Booker transformed the 
Guidelines from mandatory to advisory.35 Although advisory in 
name, the Guidelines still comprise an inherently one-way ratchet-
up system where sentences are frequently increased and are rarely 
decreased.36 In 2007, the Supreme Court further solidified the role 
of the Guidelines in sentencing determinations by creating a pre-
sumption of reasonableness for in-Guidelines sentences.37 Further, 
the Sentencing Reform Act requires the sentencing judge to con-
sider the Guidelines’ range, effectively making the Guidelines the 
starting point for sentencing determinations.38 Advisory does not 
appropriately describe the force and effect that the Guidelines have 
on present-day sentencing determinations. 
Before Booker, federal judges were bound to follow the Guide-
lines “unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 33. See generally id. at 413–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (repealed 2005) (“the court shall impose a sentence of the 
kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there 
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind . . .”); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. 
at 367.  
 35. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).  
 36. Frank O. Bowman III, Nothing is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Fed-
eral Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 356–57, (2012). 
 37. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346 (2007). 
 38. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2012). 
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taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”39 In 
Booker, the Supreme Court found that the mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution and 
held that the Guidelines were thereafter merely advisory.40 The 
Sixth Amendment41 right to a jury trial in a criminal proceeding 
means that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”42 The Booker Court held that the mandatory na-
ture of the Guidelines violated the right to trial by jury when 
judges enhanced sentences based on facts not determined by a jury 
nor admitted by the defendant.43 
In Booker, a jury found the defendant, Freddie J. Booker, 
guilty of possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of 
cocaine base (crack).44 Evidence was presented that Booker had 
92.5 grams of crack in his duffel bag.45 The Guidelines’ range for 
this offense, given Booker’s criminal history, was “not less than 201 
nor more than 262 months.”46 However, in a sentencing hearing, 
the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker 
had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and that he was 
guilty of obstructing justice.47 From these findings, the Guidelines 
mandated a range for 360 months to life imprisonment.48 Rather 
than the 21 years and 10 month maximum sentence based on jury 
findings of fact, the Guidelines required the judge to sentence 
                                                          
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (repealed 2005). 
 40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (holding that the provision of the statute making the 
Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), be severed and excised). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed . . .”). 
 42. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 43. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 44. Id. at 227. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 




Booker to a minimum of 30 years in prison, the term ultimately 
imposed by the court.49 This sentence violated Booker’s Sixth 
Amendment right.50 
The Booker Court cited several cases where courts have struck 
down sentences outside the range supported by the jury-verdict 
alone based on judge-found facts in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment.51 The Court declared that making the Guidelines advisory 
would cure the Sixth Amendment problem.52 Judges are frequently 
tasked with exercising discretion within statutory limits and this 
does not raise Sixth Amendment concerns.53 The Sixth Amend-
ment is implicated, however, when the statutory range is altered 
by a finding of fact made not by the jury but by the judge.54 In turn, 
in the portion of the majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, 
the Booker Court severed and excised two provisions of the Act that 
made the Guidelines mandatory and thereby cured the Sixth 
Amendment violations.55 
                                                          
 49. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. 
 50. Id. at 231–32. 
 51. Id. at 230–32 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (the appli-
cation of Washington’s sentencing scheme violated the defendant’s right to have a jury find 
the existence of “any particular fact” essential to the determination of punishment)); Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588–89 (2002) (impermissible for trial judge to determine presence or 
absence of aggravating factors warranting the death penalty under Arizona law); Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 490 (judge found that defendant’s conduct violated New Jersey’s “hate crime” law 
because it was racially motivated); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999) (holding 
that the harm to the victim was an element of the federal carjacking crime that needed to be 
determined by a jury). 
 52. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.  
 53. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481. 
 54. Id. at 466.  
 55. Booker, 543 U.S. at 265 (the provisions severed and excised were 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3553(b)(1) and 3742(e)). 
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Dissenting in part, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter 
and Scalia, renounced the majority’s remedy to the alleged consti-
tutional violation.56 According to Justice Stevens, the excised pro-
visions of the SRA were not unconstitutional.57 Booker’s sentencing 
would have been rectified had the two facts—responsibility for the 
additional 566 grams of crack and obstruction of justice—been 
found by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt instead 
of by the judge.58 Justice Stevens asserted, “[t]he Court’s decision 
to [invalidate the provisions] represents a policy choice that Con-
gress has considered and decisively rejected.”59 In the end, excising 
the provisions won out, and the Guidelines became advisory rather 
than mandatory.60 
A. The Post-Booker Guidelines Still Comprise an Inherently 
Ratchet-up System, and While “Advisory,” their Legal Influence 
on Sentencing has been Undiminished. 
Although Booker gave judges more discretion, the Guidelines 
are still inherently a ratchet-up system.61 The length of sentences 
has nearly tripled since the Guidelines were instituted.62 Accord-
ing to Professor Frank Bowman, Booker failed to change a major 
problem with pre-Booker sentencing—that is, that the rulemaking 
process for the Commission is designed as a one-way upward 
                                                          
 56. See id. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 273 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 59. Id. at 272.  
 60. Id. at 233. 
 61. Bowman, supra note 36, at 356–57.  
 62. Bowman, infra note 64, at 1328. From 1984 to 1990, the mean sentence imposed 
for federal crimes rose from 24 months to 46 months. Id. at 1328, n.65 (citing U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N,  THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE 
GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF 
INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 376 Figure 14 
(1991), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/137987NCJRS.pdf). By 1993, the mean 
sentence imposed increased by almost another fifty percent to 66.9 months. U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 61 Figure F (1996), http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1995/an-
nua95.htm. 




ratchet which raised sentences often and virtually never lowered 
them.63 
The SRA was intended to distribute sentencing policy-making 
power and to control sentencing among various national and local 
actors.64 However, that power has shifted from the judiciary and 
the Sentencing Commission “toward political actors in Congress 
and the central administration of justice” leading to a “one-way up-
ward ratchet. . . .”65 
There are multiple ways in which the defendant’s offense level 
can be increased, ultimately increasing the sentence imposed.66 
First, out of the twenty subsections of Chapter Three of the Guide-
lines Manual that details sentencing adjustments, only two are ap-
plicable to downward adjustments of the offense level that could 
lead to a lesser sentence for the defendant: § 3B1.2 “Mitigating 
Role” and § 3E1.1 “Acceptance of Responsibility.”67 All the remain-
ing adjustments under Chapter Three would result in increases to 
the defendant’s offense level.68 
Second, the Guidelines have an upward tendency because pol-
iticians are at the helm of sentencing policy and there is political 
pressure to be tough on crime and increase criminal penalties.69 
                                                          
 63. Bowman, infra note 64, at 1315. 
 64. Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing System: A Structural 
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2005). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3 
(2015). See e.g., id. at § 3B1.1 (the defendant’s leadership role in the crime); id. at § 3C1.1 
(obstructing or impeding the administration of justice); id. at §3B1.3 (abuse of a position of 
trust or skill). A defendant’s sentence is determined by offense level, which represents the 
seriousness of the present offense, and her criminal history category, which represents the 
defendant’s disposition for criminal activity. Bowman, supra note 64, at 1324 (citing UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4 (2005) (containing rules regarding cal-
culation of criminal history category)). 
 67. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3 (2015). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Bowman, supra note 64, at 1345 (“[P]olitical forces acting on Congress are so 
uniformly aligned in one direction--that of increasing penalties.”). 
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Although increasing sentencing penalties may have short-term po-
litical benefits, the long-term budgetary effects and consequences 
of over-incarceration are not adequately considered by politicians 
taking this stance.70 
In 2005, Professor Bowman opined that Booker brought about 
one key difference in sentencing as long as the Guidelines re-
mained a guide for appellate review: “The only theoretical differ-
ence is that the guidelines will now best be characterized as pre-
sumptive rather than mandatory. The only functional difference 
would be that we would still have guidelines with the force of law, 
but judges would have an expanded departure power.”71 
Two years later the Supreme Court confirmed Professor Bow-
man’s theory that upon appellate review a within-Guidelines sen-
tence by the district court carries a presumption of reasonableness 
in Rita v. United States.72 
In Rita, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court may 
provide a “presumption of reasonableness” to a district court sen-
tence that “reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines.”73 In that case, Victor Rita was charged with perjury, making 
false statements, and obstruction of justice for testimony he gave 
to a federal grand jury in connection with a machinegun kit he had 
purchased.74 Following a jury trial, he was convicted on all 
counts.75 At sentencing, Rita argued for a sentence below the 
properly calculated Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months for the 
following reasons: his physical condition, his vulnerability in 
prison, and his military service.76 The district court rejected Rita’s 
arguments that the sentencing range was inappropriate and sen-
tenced him to the low end of the range—33 months.77 Rita appealed 
                                                          
 70. See id. at 1345–46. 
 71. Id. at 1350 (emphasis added). 
 72. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2007). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 342–43. 
 75. Id. at 343. 
 76. Id. at 344–45. 
 77. Id. at 345. 




the sentencing decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which upheld his sentence as reasonable.78 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the sen-
tence as reasonable and established that properly within-Guide-
lines sentences are presumptively reasonable.79 The presumption 
represents the fact that “both the sentencing judge and the Sen-
tencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to 
the proper sentence in the particular case.”80 “That double deter-
mination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is 
a reasonable one.”81 
This reasoning is misguided, however, because the Commis-
sion does not make determinations on particular cases, rather it 
prescribes Guidelines for criminal offenders in the aggregate. The 
Court seems to use the logic that if two sources come to the same 
conclusion, then the conclusion is given greater weight. However, 
this ignores the fact that the two problem-solvers are not independ-
ent. The sentencing court’s sentence is partially, if not wholly, de-
pendent on the Guidelines prescribed by the Commission. 
Another consequence of Rita is that it grants even greater 
weight to the ostensibly advisory guidelines. The within-Guide-
lines presumption of reasonableness strengthens sentencing 
judges’ reliance on the Guidelines for fear of being overturned on 
appeal. Judge Richard Posner describes the “economic theory” of 
judicial behavior which “treats the judge as a rational, self-inter-
ested” individual who is striving to maximize his or her “income . . 
. power, prestige, reputation, self-respect” and so on.82 As an exten-
sion of this theory, judges are reticent to be overturned on appeal.83 
                                                          
 78. Rita, 551 U.S. at 346. 
 79. Id. at 347. 
 80. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 81. Id. 
 82. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 35–36 (2010).  
 83. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 391 (Souter, J., dissenting) (A judge is more likely to engage 
in fact finding necessary to apply a within-Guidelines sentence and are less likely to apply an 
outside the Guidelines sentence unless the judge has a “powerful reason to risk reversal on the 
sentence.”). 
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In Justice Souter’s dissent in Rita, he predicted that the presump-
tion of reasonableness would produce within-Guidelines sentences 
almost as regularly as the mandatory guidelines, thereby rekin-
dling the Sixth Amendment defect of sentences dependent on 
judge-found facts that existed pre-Booker.84 
In addition, Rita’s presumption essentially nullifies a defend-
ant’s ability to appeal a sentence for lack of reasonableness. This 
is especially true in cases where the defendant seeks to challenge 
the Commission’s decision to promulgate a specific Guideline as 
unreasonable. Nowhere in the creation of the Sentencing Commis-
sion did Congress state that the Sentencing Commission is infalli-
ble. As such, like any other human institution, the Sentencing 
Commission will from time to time make mistakes. Rita only acts 
to reinforce these mistakes and as logic might predict, judges are 
not eager to buck the trend even if they indeed believe that the 
Commission erred in its creation of a particular Guideline. 
The presumption of reasonableness perpetuates the problem 
that existed pre-Booker—that a reasonable judge could often times 
do nothing to impose an appropriate sentence outside of the Guide-
lines. The presumption worsens the problem identified by Prof. 
Bowman that making the Guidelines advisory impacted very little 
how often judges sentence outside the guidelines.85 Booker had lit-
tle impact on giving judges the freedom to sentence outside the 
Guidelines, while Rita had the effect of further confining judges to 
the Guidelines. In a sense, Rita’s presumption of reasonableness 
works against the Booker Court’s holding that the Guidelines are 
advisory. Although not legally mandatory, the Guidelines play an 
immensely significant role in federal judges’ sentencing determi-
nations. 
B. Guidelines are the Starting Point for the Court’s Sentencing 
                                                          
 84. Id. at 390.  
 85. Bowman, supra note 36, at 357–58. In FY 2010 and FY 2011, about 55% of sen-
tences were within the Guidelines as opposed to 65% for the five years preceding Booker. Bow-
man, supra note 36, at 357. See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS  Tbl. N (2011); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY 
QUARTERLY DATA REPORT  1, Tbl. 1 (4th Quarter Release, through Oct. 31, 2011) (54.7% of 
defendants sentenced within range in FY 2011).   





Lastly, the Guidelines are not merely advisory because they 
are the required starting point in the judge’s sentencing determi-
nation. In making a sentencing determination the sentencing 
judge must first consider the Guidelines.86 “[A] district court should 
begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the appli-
cable Guidelines range.”87 This illustrates that while the Guide-
lines are advisory, initial consideration by the sentencing judge is 
mandatory.88 
In sum, many of the problems that persisted pre-Booker still 
have not been resolved. Rita’s presumption that within-Guidelines 
sentences are reasonable solidifies the weight that the Guidelines 
play in sentencing decisions.89 Judges are required to calculate the 
applicable Guideline range as a first step in sentencing, and they 
are quick to avoid straying from the Guidelines in order to prevent 
being overturned on appeal.90 Finally, the scheme of the Guidelines 
causes sentences to be enhanced upward frequently.91 For these 
reasons, the Guidelines act as a powerful force in increasing rather 
than decreasing sentences. 
IV. EXISTING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SENTENCING 
The first avenue of review for a defendant challenging her sen-
tence is to claim that the sentencing court abused its discretion.92 
                                                          
 86. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). 
 87. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). “The sentencing judge, as a matter 
of process, will normally begin by considering the presentence report and its interpretation of 
the Guidelines.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32); 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (“A district judge must include the Guide-
lines range in the array of factors warranting consideration.”); see Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 112 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (the sentencing court must take the Guidelines into consideration when 
sentencing). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 359. 
 90. See Booker, 542 U.S. at 223–24. 
 91. Bowman, supra note 36, at 356–57. 
 92. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46–47. 
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The defendant can assert that the sentence imposed was procedur-
ally inadequate, for example, by showing that the § 3553(a) factors 
were not considered or that the judge gave an incomplete explana-
tion of the sentence.93 The defendant can also claim that the sen-
tence was substantively unreasonable.94 The abuse of discretion 
challenge attacks the adequacy of the sentencing judge’s imposi-
tion of a sentence and cannot be used to challenge the Commis-
sion’s decision to promulgate a particular Guideline.95 Next, a de-
fendant may challenge her sentence as violating the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.96 Under this appeal, 
the reviewing court will examine the challenged Guideline under 
the rational basis standard.97 That is, the Guideline must be up-
held if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.98 
Neither of these types of judicial review permit a challenge that 
the Commission acted arbitrarily in promulgating a particular 
Guideline.  
A. Reasonableness Review of a Sentence under the Abuse-of-
Discretion Standard 
Appellate review of a sentence imposed under the Guidelines 
is for reasonableness.99 Standard appellate review of a district 
court’s sentence is the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.100 
The reviewing court must first ensure that the sentencing court 
made no substantial procedural error such as improperly calculat-
ing the applicable Guideline range, treating the Guidelines as 
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, basing a sen-
tence on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain 
                                                          
 93. See Booker, 542 U.S. at 261. 
 94. Id.  
 95. See generally Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 96. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 97. United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 98. Id.  
 99. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490 (2011) (citing Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007)); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (the 
standard of appellate review for sentencings is whether the sentence is “unreasonable” with 
regard to the § 3553(a) factors). 
100. Gall, 552 U.S. at 56.  




the sentence imposed.101 Then, the reviewing court will consider 
“the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard.”102 
The defendant in Gall v. United States was charged with con-
spiracy to distribute ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana for his in-
volvement in distributing drugs as a college student at the Univer-
sity of Iowa.103 Although the Guidelines called for a thirty to thirty-
seven months sentence, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence 
of probation for a term of thirty-six months.104 The judge referenced 
the § 3553(a) factors and enumerated several reasons for the be-
low-Guidelines sentence, including Gall’s voluntary withdrawal 
from the conspiracy, obtaining a college degree and starting a suc-
cessful business, his lack of criminal history, and family support.105 
The Eighth Circuit overturned this sentence on the basis that the 
district court judge did not demonstrate extraordinary circum-
stances for sentencing below the Guidelines.106 Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court upheld the district court’s sentence, stating that the 
standard of appellate review of a sentence “inside or outside the 
Guidelines range” is the abuse of discretion standard.107 
B. The Rational Basis Standard of Review 
When an Equal Protection challenge is asserted by a defend-
ant sentenced under the Guidelines, all twelve circuits have re-
viewed the Commission’s rulemaking under the rational basis 
standard.108 Under a traditional Equal Protection challenge to a 
                                                          
101. Id. at 51. 
102. Id.  
103. Id. at 41.  
104. Id. at 43. 
105. Id. at 43–44. 
106. Gall, 552 U.S. at 45. 
107. Id. at 51. 
108. See Andrew N. Sacher, Inequities of the Drug War: Legislative Discrimination on 
the Cocaine Battlefield, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1159 (1997) (citing United States v. Then, 
56 F.3d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1530 (10th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Cherry, 50 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 40 
F.3d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1344 (1st Cir. 1994); 
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statute or rule, rational basis review requires that the statute or 
rule be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.109 The rational basis standard of review is quite easy for 
the government to meet. This standard does not require the Com-
mission to use the best means to achieve its goals and even permits 
decisions “based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence 
or empirical data.”110 
In the Supreme Court’s seminal case on rational basis review, 
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, respondents Jan 
Hannah and Cleburne Living Center (collectively “CLC”) filed 
claims in district court alleging that a city ordinance requiring a 
special permit for a group home to house mentally retarded per-
sons violated the Equal Protection Clause.111 The Supreme Court, 
applying rational basis review, held that the ordinance did violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.112 The City of Cleburne listed several 
purposes for requiring the special permit, all of which were rejected 
by the Supreme Court.113 “[N]egative attitudes” toward the future 
residents of the group home by neighboring property owners and 
fears of elderly residents of Cleburne were not permissible reasons 
for treating the group home differently from apartments, hotels, 
hospitals, nursing homes, and the like.114 Furthermore, protecting 
the group home residents from being harassed by a nearby school 
                                                          
United States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 602 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 
709, 713 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 612 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1220 
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 93 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Law-
rence, 951 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1991)).  
109. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); see also City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to 
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest.”). 
110. United States v. Navarro, 800 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting FCC v. 
Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)). 
111. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 435–36. 
112. Id. at 448.  
113. Id. at 448–49. 
114. Id. at 448. 




was rejected as a valid reason for the discrimination.115 The City’s 
objection that the group home was located on a 500-year flood plain 
was not a sufficient reason to treat the group home differently than 
a hospital or nursing home which could be located at the same site 
without a special use permit.116 After thorough examination of the 
city’s purported reasons for the ordinance, the Supreme Court held 
that the ordinance was based on the “irrational prejudice against 
the mentally retarded.”117 Because the ordinance was not ration-
ally related to a legitimate government interest, it unconstitution-
ally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.118 
In conducting a rational basis analysis, a court must first find 
the government purpose behind its decision to act.119 In U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari on a challenge to an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that 
prohibited participants in the program from living with persons in 
the same household to whom they were unrelated.120 The express 
purposes of the Food Stamp Act were found in a congressional “dec-
laration of policy.”121 Among these were: the goal to “raise levels of 
nutrition among low-income households . . . ,” “promot[ing] the dis-
tribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances . . 
. ,” and to “alleviate such hunger and malnutrition . . . .”122 The 
challenged disparity in classifying households with related individ-
uals with those that had members unrelated to each other was 
“clearly irrelevant” to these stated purposes.123 To uphold this clas-
                                                          
115. Id. at 449. 
116. Id. 
117. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450. 
118. Id. 
119. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533. 
120. Id. at 530. 
121. Id. at 533. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 534. 
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sification, the amendment would need to serve some other legiti-
mate government purpose.124 In analyzing the legislative history to 
the amendment, the Court held that the state purpose of prevent-
ing “hippies” and “hippie communes” from taking advantage of the 
program was not a legitimate government interest.125 Simply pre-
venting a politically unpopular group from patronizing the food 
stamp program does not constitute a legitimate government pur-
pose.126 Similarly, the Court rejected the government’s argument 
that the amendment was intended to prevent fraud.127 For these 
reasons, the amendment failed the rational basis test and was 
struck down in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.128 
C. Rational Basis Applied to the Guidelines 
Equal protection challenges to the Guidelines receive rational 
basis review.129 Even prior to Congress reducing the disparity in 
sentencing ranges between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, sev-
eral circuits found that the 100-to-1 disparity passed the rational 
basis test.130 Despite the disproportionate affect this disparity had 
on black people, these circuits found that Congress had a legiti-
mate government interest in prescribing harsher penalties for 
crack because it is more addictive, more dangerous, and can be sold 
in smaller quantities than its powder counterpart.131 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have re-
jected Equal Protection challenges in the Guidelines’ treatment of 
                                                          
124. Id. 
125. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.  
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 535. 
128. Id. at 538. 
129. Sacher, supra note 108, at 1168. 
130. See, e.g., United States v. King, 972 F.2d 1259, 1260 (11th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928 (1992); United 
States v. House, 939 F.2d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39 
(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
131. See, e.g., King, 972 F.2d at 1260; Watson, 953 F.2d at 898; House, 939 F.2d at 664; 
Thomas, 900 F.2d at 39; Cyrus, 890 F.2d at 1248. 




illegal reentry, § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).132 This Guideline created an en-
hancement of sixteen offense levels for defendants previously con-
victed of an aggravating felony.133 In United States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 
defendant Roman Ruiz-Chairez was convicted of illegal reentry.134 
He appealed his sentence on the ground that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because the enhancement he received under § 
2L1.2(b)(1)(A) was more severe than that of other felonies.135 Spe-
cifically, Ruiz-Chairez compared the severity of the enhancement 
under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) with the enhancement under § 2K2.1(a)(4) 
for possession of a firearm.136 Because Ruiz-Chairez was previously 
                                                          
132. See United States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 1992).  
133.  
If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the 
United States, after— 
 (A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for 
which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence; 
(iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; (v) a national se-
curity or terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking offense; or (vii) an al-
ien smuggling offense, increase by 16 levels. . . . 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (Nov. 1, 
2004), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2004/manual/CHAP2-
4.pdf.  
The Guidelines effective November 1, 2004 were in effect at the time of Ruiz-Chairez’s sen-
tencing on March 25, 2005. See Appellant Roman Ruiz-Chairez’s Opening Brief at 2, United 
States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2007), No. 05-10226, 2005 WL 3132445, at *2. 
On November 1, 2016, the Sentencing Commission significantly amended § 2L1.2. Of note, the 
Commission removed the sixteen-level enhancement for crimes enumerated above, replacing 
it with an increase of up to four levels for prior illegal reentry offenses and an increase of up 
to ten levels for prior felony convictions (other than an illegal reentry offense) based on the 
term of the sentenced imposed. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 2L1.2 (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2016-guidelines-manual/2016-
chapter-2-l-x#NaN.  
134. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d at 1090. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
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convicted of a “crime of violence,”137 his base offense level was in-
creased sixteen levels to twenty-four.138 Under § 2K2.1(a)(4) for un-
lawful possession of a firearm, a similar prior offense would result 
in an adjusted offense level of only twenty.139 In his Equal Protec-
tion claim, Ruiz-Chairez argued that this discrepancy demon-
strated that the Commission acted arbitrarily and violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.140 In rejecting his argument, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the severity of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) did meet the ra-
tional basis standard.141 The court cursorily stated that the legiti-
mate government interest in Ruiz-Chairez’s case was “deterring il-
legal reentry.”142 In offering some justification, the court quoted the 
Eleventh Circuit, “[T]he Sentencing Commission may have con-
cluded that an alien who has been convicted of a felony should be 
strongly deterred from re-entering the United States, a considera-
tion not present with respect to an American citizen.”143 This ex-
emplifies the nature of rational basis review—there is no require-
ment that the Commission actually have a legitimate government 
interest for its action; a speculative government interest will do. 
 
V. THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
The arbitrary and capricious standard is a common standard 
of judicial review of actions of administrative agencies.144 The Ad-
                                                          
137. Ruiz-Chairez’s previous conviction of a drug-trafficking offense also warrants the 
enhancement under the Guidelines. Id.  
138. Id.  
139. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4) 
(Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2016-guidelines-manual/2016-chapter-2-l-
x#NaN. 
140. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d at 1090. 
141. Id. at 1091. 
142. Id. at 1092. 
143. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1160 
(11th Cir. 1992)). 
144. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2016). 




ministrative Procedure Act (APA) prescribes this standard as a de-
fault standard of review in certain instances.145 Section 706(2)(A) 
of the APA states, “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and 
set aside any agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . 
. . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law. . . .”146 The arbitrary and capricious standard 
has two functions. First, it is the standard of review of the factual 
basis for certain agency decisions, including informal adjudications 
and informal rulemaking.147 Second, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard applies to judicial review of the overall rationality of the 
agency decision.148 The latter requires the reviewing court to deter-
mine if the agency considered all relevant factors and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment.149 In other words, the 
agency must engage in reasoned decision making.150 An agency rul-
ing would be arbitrary and capricious: 
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not 
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an im-
portant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
                                                          
145. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966). 
146. Id. (emphasis added). 
147. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 (1971) 
(the APA defines both “rule” and “order.”); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (6) (1966)  (a rule derives 
from “rule making” and an order derives from an “adjudication.”); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54 (1966) 
(the APA specifies unique procedures for both actions and determining whether Congress 
granted the agency the authority to engage in rulemaking or adjudication is an often source of 
debate and litigation. The Supreme Court created a framework for determining if an action is 
rulemaking or an adjudication.); see Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 
(1908);  Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. St. Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). This Comment will 
not distinguish between the Commission’s actions as rules or orders. 
148. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416; see also RICHARD SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 845–46 
(2013). 
149. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416. 
150. Id.; SEAMON, supra note 148, at 845. 
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agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to 
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.151 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. involved the rulemaking decisions 
of the Secretary of Transportation under the National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.152 The purpose of the Act was to 
reduce injuries and deaths due to traffic accidents.153 The Act 
tasked the Secretary of Transportation with establishing manda-
tory motor vehicle safety standards—in other words, the Act 
granted the Secretary of Transportation informal rulemaking au-
thority.154 It also directed the Secretary to consider “relevant avail-
able motor vehicle data” and the extent to which the proposed 
standards would promote the purposes of the Act.155 The Secretary 
of Transportation delegated this authority to the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), an agency in the 
Transportation Department.156 The NHTSA issued the rule “Mod-
ified Standard 208,” which provided that all new vehicles during 
model years 1982–1984 would be equipped with either automatic 
seatbelts or airbags, giving the manufacturer the choice of which 
to install.157 This standard was promulgated in part because the 
NHTSA found that providing these passive restraints “could pre-
vent approximately 12,000 deaths and over 100,000 serious inju-
ries annually.”158 
In February 1981, after a new presidential administration 
came to power, the rulemaking process was reopened and the pas-
                                                          
151. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
152. Id. at 33; 15 U.S.C.A § 1381 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980) (repealed 1994). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 33, 41. 
155. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(1), (3), (4) (repealed 1994)). 
156. Id. at 34 n.3. 
157. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 37. 
158. Id. at 35. 




sive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208 was re-
scinded.159 The question for the Supreme Court was whether re-
voking parts of Modified Standard 208 was arbitrary and capri-
cious.160 The Secretary gave the following reasons for rescinding 
the passive restraint requirement: (1) the automobile industry 
planned to install seatbelts 99% of the time so the effects of airbags 
could not be realized;161 and (2) the seatbelts could be easily de-
tached leaving the existing problem with manual belts that users 
must take some affirmative action.162 Accordingly, the agency con-
cluded that there was no longer a basis for predicting that usage of 
passive restraints would be significantly increased.163 This line of 
reasoning led the Court to find that the agency’s action was arbi-
trary and capricious.164 First, the agency failed to consider requir-
ing the use of airbags as part of the standard.165 Second, “the 
agency was too quick to dismiss the benefits of automatic seat-
belts.”166 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that only a 
justifiable excuse not to seek further evidence on this issue would 
render it non-arbitrary.167 In sum, the agency’s decision to rescind 
the passive restraint requirement was not the result of reasoned 
decision-making, and was therefore arbitrary and capricious.168 
                                                          
159. Id. at 38. 
160. Id. at 34. 
161. Id. at 38. 
162. Id. at 38–39. 
163. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 39. 
164. Id. at 46. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 51. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 52. 
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Professor Richard Seamon has summarized the requirement 
of reasoned decision-making.169 First, the “agency’s reasoning pro-
cess must be rational and comprehensible.”170 Second, the agency 
must consider all relevant factors.171 Third, the agency should not 
base its decision on irrelevant factors.172 Fourth, there should be “a 
clear, logical connection between the agency’s factual determina-
tions and its ultimate decision.”173 And fifth, the agency’s action 
must be consistent with prior agency action unless the agency ad-
equately explains its change of course.174 
A. The Guidelines are not Subject to Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review 
A rule promulgated by an administrative agency is typically 
subject to a challenge in federal court pursuant to Chapter 7 of the 
APA.175 In other words, a party aggrieved by an agency action can 
seek judicial review of the agency action.176 The Supreme Court 
has a long-standing tradition of permitting judicial review.177 
Nonetheless, two circuit courts have held that the Sentencing Com-
mission’s decisions are not subject to the APA’s arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard of judicial review.178 Instead, the D.C. Circuit 
and the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend for 
                                                          
169. SEAMON, supra note 148, at 838–39. 
170. Id. at 838. 
171. Id.  
172. Id.  
173. Id.  
174. Id. at 839.  
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966). 
176. Id. 
177. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
178. See United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Andrade 
v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 989 F.2d 308, 309 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) and the APA do not apply to the Commission). 




certain provisions of the APA, including the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of judicial review, to apply to the Sentencing Com-
mission.179 
In United States v. Lopez, the defendant, Clarence Morales—
charged under the name José Lopez—received a 51-month sen-
tence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine 
base.180 On appeal, Morales made several claims alleging the trial 
court erred in determining his sentence.181 First, Morales claimed 
that the sentencing judge erred in refusing to grant a downward 
departure based on his age and background.182 Second, Morales ar-
gued that not considering his age violated due process.183 Third, 
and most importantly for the purposes of this article, Morales chal-
lenged § 5H1.1 of the Guidelines “on the basis that the Sentencing 
Commission had failed to explain why a defendant's youth should 
not ordinarily be taken into account by the sentencing court.”184 
The then-current version of § 5H1.1 stated that age is “not ordinar-
ily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside 
the guidelines. . . .”185 As to Morales’s first claim, the court found 
that the district court judge did not abuse his discretion in finding 
that there lacked a showing that this case was extraordinary 
enough to consider age.186 Similarly, the court cursorily disposed of 
the due process claim.187 
As for Morales’s claim that the Sentencing Commission failed 
to give adequate reasons for declaring that age is ordinarily not 
relevant, the court determined that it lacked authority to review 
                                                          
179. Id. 
180. Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1294–95.  
181. Id. at 1295–96. 
182. Id. at 1296. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
5H1.1 (Nov. 1, 1987) (amended 2010)). 
186. Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1294.  
187. Id. at 1296 (citing United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 539–40 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
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the adequacy of the Commission’s basis, or rationale, for promul-
gating such Guidelines.188 The court reasoned that “well-settled 
Administrative Law principles” have limited applicability to this 
case.189 These “well-settled Administrative Law principles” refer to 
the idea that the default rule for administrative agencies is that 
agency actions can be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard.190 Instead, the court held that Congress did not intend 
for the Commission’s actions to be subject to judicial review under 
the APA.191 This determination of Congressional intent was two-
fold: first, by subjecting the Commission to one section of the APA, 
Congress impliedly excluded the applicability of all other provi-
sions of the APA to the Commission; second, the legislative history 
confirmed that Congress did not intend for the judicial review pro-
visions of the APA to apply.192 
Regarding the first point, the Lopez court held that § 994(x) of 
the SRA determines the extent to which the APA applies to the 
Commission and the Guidelines.193 This section states: “The provi-
sions of section 553 of title 5, relating to publication in the Federal 
Register and public hearing procedure, shall apply to the promul-
gation of guidelines pursuant to this section.”194 
Applying the canon of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the 
court concluded that by subjecting the promulgation of the Guide-
lines to this one provision of the APA, “Congress affirmed that the 
Commission's rulemaking was not subject to any other provision of 
the APA, including those for judicial review.”195 The Eighth and 
Ninth circuits have followed this line of reasoning.196 
                                                          
188. Id. at 1297. 
189. Id. 
190. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  
191. Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1297. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (2012).  
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Next, the Lopez court held that the legislative history on § 
994(x) of the SRA confirms that Congress did not intend the Com-
mission to be subject to judicial review under the APA.197 The court 
quoted the following language of the Senate Committee Report: 
[Section 994(x)] is an exception to the general inapplicabil-
ity of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . to the judicial 
branch. 
. . . . 
It is . . . not intended that the guidelines be subject to ap-
pellate review under chapter 7 of title 5. There is ample pro-
vision for review of the guidelines by the Congress and the 
public; no additional review of the guidelines as a whole is 
either necessary or desirable.198 
This Senate Committee Report convinced the D.C. Circuit that 
Congress did not intend to subject the Commission to all of the pro-
visions of the APA. Accordingly, Lopez established that the Guide-
lines are not subject to judicial review under the APA, and by ex-
tension, are not held to the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
reasonableness. 
The Ninth Circuit similarly held that the APA does not apply 
to the Commission except to the extent to which § 994(x) applies.199 
In Andrade v. U.S. Sentencing Commission, the plaintiff brought 
suit in order to compel the Commission to comply with a Freedom 
of Information Act (“FOIA”) request.200 The FOIA is part of the 
APA; because Congress spoke to the specific provisions of the APA 
which apply to the Commission in § 994(x), it implicitly exempted 
                                                          
the provisions of the APA not mentioned in § 994(x)); United States v. Johnson, 703 F.3d 464, 
468 (8th Cir. 2013). 
197. Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1297. 
198. Id. (citing S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 180–81 (1983)). 
199. Andrade, 989 F.2d at 309.  
200. Id. 
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other provisions of the APA, including the FOIA, from applying.201 
Although Andrade does not speak directly to the judicial review 
provisions of the APA, following the court’s reasoning that only  § 
994(x) applies would yield the same result.202 
The Eighth Circuit has held that it didn’t have the authority 
to review the Commission’s reasoning for issuing a policy state-
ment.203 In United States v. Johnson, Defendant Johnson appealed 
his sentencing on various grounds, including a claim that the Com-
mission acted arbitrarily and capriciously.204 Johnson was con-
victed of “conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine 
base (crack cocaine), . . .  and for distribution of and possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine base.”205 Johnson challenged “the Com-
mission's decision not to make Amendment 742 retroactive . . . .”206 
If Amendment 742 was retroactive, Johnson’s criminal history cat-
egory would have decreased by one level.207 
At his original sentence date in 2005, Johnson’s criminal his-
tory category level was VI.208 This level was partially increased be-
cause of § 4A1.1, which adds criminal history points to the defend-
ant when the instant crime is committed in a short time after the 
defendant’s release from prison on a former crime.209 On November 
1, 2010, the Commission issued a policy statement establishing 
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Amendment 742, which eliminated these recency points.210 The 
court determined it did not have the authority to review the Com-
mission’s decision to issue this policy statement, denying Johnson’s 
claims.211 
VI. A CALL FOR CONGRESS TO MAKE THE GUIDELINES 
SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Agencies are not perfect. The Sentencing Commission is not 
perfect. This is why there needs to be meaningful judicial review of 
the Guidelines passed by the Commission. When a rule is passed 
without proper consideration, or with no consideration, of the rele-
vant factors set out in the SRA, a party aggrieved by the rule—
most typically a sentenced defendant—should have a meaningful 
opportunity to challenge the rule as arbitrary and capricious.212 
This would force reviewing courts to provide a meaningful review 
of the Commission’s decision-making process. The appellate courts 
are uniquely capable of reviewing the Sentencing Commission’s de-
cisions because these courts routinely exercise review of criminal 
sentencings. This is unlike many other administrative agency ac-
tions where the courts might not have expertise in the substance 
of the agency action. 
To institute arbitrary and capricious review of the Guidelines, 
Congress should create a special review provision that can be in-
corporated in the SRA. “The APA was meant to bring uniformity 
to a field full of variation and diversity.”213 “Some facets of an ad-
ministrative decision, because they raise issues within the courts' 
area of competence, are well suited to judicial oversight.”214 The 
standard of judicial review of an agency action will depend on the 
                                                          
210. Johnson, 703 F.3d at 466.  
211. Id. 
212. Congress would make the determination of who has standing to challenge the 
rule. If the APA language is followed, a person “adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency 
action” would be the standard for standing. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). A defendant sentenced 
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agency’s competence in the area.215 Some facets of administrative 
decisions are suitable to stringent judicial oversight, while others 
require more deference to the agency’s decision.216 
Many existing statutes provide the standard of judicial review 
that applies to agency rulemaking or adjudications. One example 
is the judicial review provision of the Consumer Product Safety 
Act, which states “The . . . safety rule shall not be affirmed unless 
the Commission’s findings . . . are supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record taken as a whole . . . .”217 Another review stat-
ute subjecting agency rulemaking to judicial review under the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard is 5 U.S.C. § 7703, which regulates 
the Merit Systems Protection Board.218 The statute reads: 
In any case filed in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, the court shall review the record and 
hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings, or 
conclusions found to be— 
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law . . . .219 
The language under subection (1) is identical to that of the APA, 
which also calls for arbitrary and capricious review.220 The APA 
states: “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law . . . .”221 
As these statutes demonstrate, courts are accustomed to this 
kind of language and this type of judicial review. Because the prob-
lems with the Guidelines identified in Part IV warrant heightened 
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review,222 Congress should amend the SRA and create a special re-
view statute to that affect. An example of the review statute would 
be as follows: 
28 U.S.C. § 999. Judicial Review 
(a) Any person adversely affected by a rule or order prom-
ulgated by the Commission, may file a petition with the 
Court of Appeals within the district that such party resides, 
or with the Court of Appeals within the district that the 
sentence was imposed. 
(b) The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside 
any action by the Commission found to be— 
 (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not 
otherwise in accordance with law. 
(c) This section is not intended to modify or supersede any 
other provision under this Act, including § 994(x).223 
A. The Proposed Standard Would Enable Courts to Meaningfully 
Review the Commission’s Rationale 
Creating the above special review provision would alleviate 
problems caused by arbitrary Guidelines. First, it would require 
reviewing courts to determine if the Commission engaged in rea-
soned decision-making in promulgating the Guidelines. The SRA 
conveniently states the purposes of the Commission and the Guide-
lines, and the Commission would be forced to consider these pur-
poses in its decision-making. Furthermore, this provision would 
force the Commission to state its reasons behind certain Guide-
lines, bringing a long-awaited and much-needed level of transpar-
ency to this enigmatic judicial branch agency. In theory, this rec-
ord-keeping requirement will promote cautious and well-reasoned 
decisions by the Commission. 
Under the proposed amendment, the reviewing court would 
first look to see if the Commission considered the relevant factors 
when creating the Sentencing Guidelines. The relevant factors to 
be considered were mandated by Congress in the SRA in two main 
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places.224 First, Congress gave the purposes to the Commission in 
28 U.S.C. § 991(b): 
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission 
are to— 
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Fed-
eral criminal justice system that— 
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set 
forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; 
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes 
of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences 
when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not 
taken into account in the establishment of general sentenc-
ing practices; and 
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in 
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal 
justice process; and 
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sen-
tencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in 
meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.225 
The second source of relevant factors the Commission must 
consider, as mentioned twice in the language of § 991(b), are the 
§ 3553(a)(2) factors. These factors are the following: 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be im-
posed, shall consider— 
the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote re-
spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 
offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
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(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defend-
ant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vo-
cational training, medical care, or other correctional treat-
ment in the most effective manner. . . .226 
Under the proposed statute the reviewing court would ask 
whether the Commission adequately considered the purposes of § 
991(b) and the § 3553(a)(2) factors.227 To meet the former, a Guide-
line must meet the following purposes: avoid unwarranted dispar-
ities in the Guidelines while maintaining flexibility in sentencing 
when necessary. To meet the latter, the Guideline must reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, promote deterrence, protect the public 
from future crimes, and promote rehabilitation. 
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Review Applied to Ruiz-Chairez and 
Johnson 
Applying arbitrary and capricious review would have a signif-
icant impact on the reviewing court’s analysis in Ruiz-Chairez. 
Most importantly, the government would not be able to sit back 
and enjoy the free pass it received under the rational basis test. 
Rather, the government would be required to demonstrate the 
Commission’s reasons for the discrepancy of the adjusted offense 
levels between the crimes of illegal reentry and felon in possession 
of a firearm. Specifically, the government would have the burden 
of demonstrating that the Commission properly considered the 
purposes of sentencing set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(2). The Ruiz-Chairez court stated that the defendant’s 
argument that a felon in possession of a firearm is inherently more 
dangerous than illegal reentry “misses the point.”228 Perhaps, this 
comparison misses the point in considering whether the illegal 
reentry Guideline satisfies the rational basis standard, but such a 
comparison would be critical in determining if the Commission 
acted arbitrarily when it created the Guideline. Indeed, this argu-
ment addresses an alleged unwarranted disparity in the Guide-
lines. If a court subsequently determines that § 2L1.2 created an 
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unwarranted disparity, the Guideline would be struck down as ar-
bitrary and capricious. 
Furthermore, the court would review the decision to imple-
ment the sixteen offense level enhancement with respect to the rel-
evant § 3553(a)(2) factors. If the reviewing court were to find that 
the Commission did not consider the relevant factors in determin-
ing the offense levels, then the challenged enhancement could be 
invalidated as arbitrary and capricious. The sixteen offense level 
enhancement does deter illegal reentry, and it arguably protects 
the public from future crimes because the defendant will be behind 
bars for longer. However, a court reviewing the Guideline may de-
termine that the steep enhancement is out of proportion with the 
seriousness of the offense, does not serve to protect the public from 
the future crimes of the defendant (because the defendant’s crime 
is merely remaining in the U.S.), and does not provide the defend-
ant with rehabilitative, educational or vocational treatment.229 For 
these reasons, the government may fail to meet its burden that the 
Commission engaged in reasoned decision-making in promulgat-
ing the Guideline. 
Next, looking at United States v. Johnson under the proposed 
standard, a reviewing court would look to the Commission’s ra-
tionale behind Amendment 742, and specifically, the Commission’s 
rationale for denying the Amendment retroactive effect. The re-
viewing court would first ask whether the Commission considered 
the purposes under § 3553(a)(2) in denying retroactivity. The re-
viewing court would take a close look and inquire: Would such de-
nial reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the 
law, and provide just punishment for the offense? 
In these examples, the hypothetical outcomes are uncertain. 
However, creating judicial review of the Sentencing Commission 
would have positive effects. First, instituting the proposed amend-
ment would expose the thought processes of the Commission. It 
would also shift the burden to the government to defend the Com-
mission’s actions. The special review provision would increase the 
level of scrutiny of the reviewing court on the actions of the Com-
mission, forcing the reviewing court to take a close look at the dis-
puted Guideline. In turn, this would incentivize the Commission to 
act cautiously in promulgating the Guidelines and to justify any 
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actions in terms of the purposes of the SRA and the purposes of the 
Commission. Increasing transparency will improve the public per-
ception that the Guidelines are fair. Lastly, the judicial review pro-
vision would act as a backstop for human errors which the Com-
mission is bound to commit.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are in need of a backstop 
to prevent arbitrary Guidelines from remaining in effect. The Su-
preme Court has given little credence to claims that the Guidelines 
are arbitrary because, since Booker, judges are not required to sen-
tence within the Guidelines. Rational basis review offers minimal 
scrutiny to the Guidelines. At present, the Commission may pass 
arbitrary Guidelines without considering the purposes of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act or the § 3553(a) factors. If created, an arbitrary 
Guideline could have a significant impact on sentences imposed by 
judges and it would carry a presumption of reasonableness on ap-
peal if the sentence is imposed within the Guideline range. Advi-
sory or not, the influence of the Guidelines is both real and sub-
stantial. 
By amending the SRA to include arbitrary and capricious re-
view of the Guidelines, an arbitrary Guideline would be struck 
down. This standard is currently applied to agency actions of ad-
ministrative agencies subject to the judicial review provisions of 
the APA, meaning courts are capable of applying the same stand-
ard to the actions of the Sentencing Commission. Hapless defend-
ants would cease to bear the brunt of the Commission’s failure to 
exercise reasoned decision-making. Ultimately, this check on the 
Commission would restore faith in the fairness of federal sentenc-
ing. 
